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Abstract
The classical Bagehot’s conception of a Lender of Last Resort that lends to illiquid banks
has been criticized on two grounds: on the one hand, the distinction between insolvency
and illiquidity is not clear cut; on the other a fully collateralized repo market allows
Central Banks to provide the adequate aggregated amount of liquidity and leave the
responsibility of lending uncollateralized to the banks thus giving them a role as peer
monitors. The …rst criticism leaves us with no theory of a Lender of Last Resort, while
the second leaves us with no Lender of Last Resort in theory. The object of this paper is
to analyze rigorously these issues by providing a framework where liquidity shocks cannot
be distinguished from solvency ones and ask whether there is a need for a Lender of Last
Resort and how should it operate. Determining the optimal Lender of Last Resort policy
requires a careful modeling of the structure of the interbank market and of the closure
policy. In our set up, the results depend upon the existence of moral hazard. If the main
source of moral hazard is the banks’ lack of incentives to screen loans, then the Lender
of Last Resort may have to intervene to improve the e¢ciency of an unsecured interbank
market; if instead, the main source of moral hazard is loans monitoring, then the interbank
market should be secured and the Lender of Last Resort should never intervene.
1 Introduction
This paper o¤ers a new perspective on the role of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA)
by the Central Bank (CB) often referred to as the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). We take
into account two well acknowledged facts of the banking industry: …rst that it is di¢cult to
disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks; second that moral hazard and gambling
for resurrection are typical behaviors for banks experiencing …nancial distress.
The LOLR policy has a long history. Bagehot’s (1873) "classical" view maintained
that the LOLR policy should satisfy at least three conditions: (i) lending should be open
only to solvent institutions and against good collateral, (ii) these loans must be at a
penalty rate, so that banks cannot use them to fund their current operations, (iii) the CB
should make clear in advance its readiness to lend without limits to a bank that ful…ls
the conditions on solvency and collateral.
In today’s world, the ”classical” Bagehot’s conception of a Lender of Last Resort has
been under attack from two di¤erent fronts. First, the distinction between solvency and
illiquidity is less than clear-cut. As Goodhart (1987), (1995) points out the banks that
require the assistance of the LOLR are already under suspicion of being insolvent.1 Second
it has been argued (for example by Goodfriend and King (1988) that the existence of a
fully collateralized repo market allows Central Banks to provide the adequate aggregated
amount of liquidity and leave the responsibility of lending uncollateralized to the banks
thus giving them a role as peer monitors, and introducing market discipline. Furthermore
if indeed the LOLR policy is to lend against good collateral, it is not clear why, except
for the case where money markets do not operate correctly (e.g. because of coordination
failures, a case analyzed in Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2000) an open market policy would
not be enough to guarantee the e¢ciency of the program.
These arguments are so convincing that the Bagehot view of the LOLR is seen as
obsolete in a well developed …nancial system. Yet, it should be emphasized that although
it is appropriate to dismiss the Bagehot’s view, there is no existent set of rules to replace
it. From an institutional perspective, the discount window provides liquidity support to
banks in a discretionary way. For example the Marginal Lending Facility in the Eurosys-
tem leaves full discretion to the National Central Banks (NCBs) regarding whether the
collateral presented by a borrowing institution is eligible or not, so NCB discretion has
replaced a set of clear-cut rules. On the theory side, things may look better but only at
…rst glance. The Goodfriend-King’s argument sounds attractive only if we assume perfect
interbank markets (both repo and unsecured). But this contrasts with the asymmetric
information assumption that is regarded as the main justi…cation for the existence of
banks.2 Goodfriend-King’s argument sounds even less attractive if we take into account
Goodhart’s criticism: when liquidity and solvency shocks cannot be distinguished, the
1Fur…ne (2001) provides empirical evidence of banks’ reluctance to borrow from the FED discount
window for fear of the stigma associated with it.
2 In the UK, the announcement of BCCI’s closure on 5 July 1991 rapidly accelerated the withdrawal of
wholesale funds from small and medium-sized UK banks. In a perfect interbank market, this would have
led to loans from large to small banks, as the withdrawals of funds from small banks was deposited in
large banks. But the interbank market did not recycle back the funds and within three years, a quarter
of the banks in this sector had, in some sense, failed.
interbank market is far from being perfect. So, to summarize, if we agree with both
Goodfriend-King, and Goodhart’s criticisms we are simply left with no theory of the
LOLR interventions.
The object of this paper is to analyze rigorously these issues, ask whether there is a
need for a Lender of Last Resort and how should it operate by providing a framework
where liquidity shocks cannot be distinguished from solvency ones. As we shall see in the
sequel determining the optimal Lender of Last Resort policy requires the correct modeling
of the structure of the interbank market and of the bank closure policy.
By building a model that takes into account both criticisms, we …nd a new role for the
LOLR. This new role stems from the unique possibility that the CB has to change the
priority of claims on bank’s assets. In periods of crisis, borrowing in the interbank market
may impose a high penalty on banks because of the high spread demanded on loans. As
noticed by Goodfriend and Lacker (1999), the CB has the power to change the priority
of claims and thus it can lend at lower rates than the market.
We construct a model in which banks are confronted with interim shocks that may
come from uncertain withdrawals by impatient consumers (liquidity shocks) or from losses
on the long term projects they have …nanced (solvency shocks). Banks are of three types:
illiquid (if they have a large fraction of impatient consumers; i.e. they su¤er a liquidity
shock), insolvent (if their investment is worth little; i.e. they su¤er a solvency shock),
or normal if they do not su¤er from any shock. We take for granted that the opacity of
banks’ balance sheets makes it di¢cult to distinguish among insolvent, illiquid and normal
banks both for the market and for the regulators. Thus, in acting as the LOLR, the CB
faces the possibility that an insolvent bank may pose as an illiquid bank. In particular we
envision a situation where the insolvent bank is able to borrow either from the interbank
market or from the CB and “gambles for resurrection”, that is, it invests the loan in the
continuation of a project with a negative expected net present value.
We distinguish two types of moral hazard, that we refer to as ex ante or screening moral
hazard and interim or monitoring moral hazard. Because these two types of screening
play a key role in our analysis it is important to clarify their economic justi…cation as well
as to understand which of the two will be prevailing. In the screening moral hazard the
cost of an e¤ort depends on how di¢cult it is to identify the sound …rms to lend to. It
therefore depends on the heterogeneity of the population that is applying for a loan. For
the banks, it is easier to screen …rms in a stable than in a changing environment (Rajan
and Zingales 2003); it is also easier at the beginning of an upturn, because the worst
…rms have gone bankrupt than at the end of an upturn when a larger proportion of lame
ducks is to be expected. We thus expect screening moral hazard to be more stringent in
these occasions. On the other hand, we also expect this constraint to be more stringent
in some countries than in others. This will indeed be the case because of di¤erent roles
of the banking industry, because of the di¤erence in the costs of setting up a business,
because of the di¤erent disclosure requirements, and because of the presence or not of
credit bureaus and rating agencies (see Pagano and Jappelli 1993).
The interpretation of the monitoring moral hazard is di¤erent. In some countries,
banks have easy access to information about the development of every …rm they have …-
nanced and the cost of monitoring is low. This is the case in particular for bank dominated
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countries where the bank’s representative may seat in the board of directors. In others
countries, instead, it will be more di¢cult to obtain information on the development of
the …rms projects.
Our main …ndings are that when the main source of moral hazard is monitoring, a fully
secured interbank market allows to implement the e¢cient allocation. When, instead, the
main source of moral hazard is screening, if it is impossible to distinguish between illiquid
and insolvent banks, the interbank market should be unsecured and there may be a role
for Central Bank lending. When this occurs, the LOLR overrides the priority of the
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and thus lends against the assets of the bank and o¤ers a
better rate, at a cost to the DIF. This should take place when markets spreads demanded
on interbank loans are excessively high, and should happen regardless of whether the
deposit insurance company bails out insolvent banks or liquidates them, although it will
be more frequent in the latter case. As a consequence, the e¢cient structure of the
interbank market, (secured or unsecured) is related to the nature of the main type of
moral hazard the banks are facing (monitoring or screening respectively). In the …rst case
the Goodfriend-King argument applies, while in the second case there is a speci…c role for
the LOLR policy.
Our result may clarify the debate on the role of the LOLR: when market discipline is
the most important feature of an e¢cient banking system, because it gives the banks the
incentives to screen their borrowers, the interbank market has to be unsecured and the
LOLR may intervene in order to limit illiquid banks excessive liquidation of assets. On
the other hand, if the basic role of the interbank market is to provide liquidity insurance,
the interbank market claims can be made senior.
Of course information problems would be immaterial if banks had a su¢cient amount
of capital. That is why any model that deals with these issues has to consider that
capital is scarce. As a consequence, there is a trade-o¤ between the banks’ safety and
their funding costs. Our approach avoids the arbitrary resolution of this trade-o¤ by
considering the overall e¢ciency in terms of the total added value of the banking industry.
Thus, not surprisingly, our framework provides as a by product a theory of optimal capital
regulation. The amount of capital depends on how the interbank market works which in
turn depends on the moral hazard constraints the banks are facing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the basic model of
adverse selection of bank’s types and moral hazard of bankers. In Section 3 we consider
a perfect information setting and show how the interbank market can implement the
e¢cient allocation. In Section 4 we bring in gambling for resurrection and consider the
possibility of bailing out the insolvent banks and establish how the interbank market has
to be structured. In Section 5 we show how and when Central Bank lending through a
discount window will improve upon the market allocation. Finally in Section 6 we extend
our results to an economy where it is impossible to prevent gambling for resurrection.
Section 7 draws policy implications and concludes.
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2 The Model
We consider an economy with three dates (t = 0; 1; 2) where pro…t maximizing banks o¤er
contracts to depositors while investing in a risky long term technology. At date t = 0
deposits are collected and investment is made. At t = 1, a bank can be in 3 possible
states, denoted k = S; L;N ; a bank may face a solvency shock (k = S), a liquidity shock
(k = L) or no shock at all (k = N). At date t = 2 returns on investment are divided
between depositors and a bank’s shareholders.
2.1 Bank and depositors
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks serve a large number of risk-averse depositors
that need intertemporal insurance because they face idiosyncratic shocks about the timing
of their consumption needs.
We normalize the riskless interest rate to zero. Implicit behind this assumption is
the idea that the CB conducts ”regular” liquidity management operations, for reason
of monetary policy implementation, irrespective of …nancial stability. We also assume
the existence of a DIF that guarantees all deposits. Deposit insurance is …nanced by
actuarially fair premia. Since depositors are fully insured by the DIF, the optimal contract
o¤ered to depositors allows them to withdraw the amount initially deposited D in each
period. Fully insured depositors are totally passive in the model. In modern banks a
sizeable portion of deposits is held by large uninsured depositors. However, in many
crisis resolutions, large depositors often have been de facto fully insured as well, thus for
simplicity we assume that there is only one category of depositors and that they are fully
insured.
We neglect internal agency problems within banks, and assume that risk-neutral bank
managers (henceforth bankers) endeavor to maximize the bank’s shareholders value. We
assume that there exists a supervisory agency, which we call the Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA), in charge of providing incentives for bankers to invest in ”safe and sound”
projects. The FSA can refuse to charter a bank at t = 0 if it does not satisfy certain regu-
latory conditions that will be speci…ed later (essentially a capital adequacy requirement)
and can also close a bank (at t = 1) if it …nds out that it is insolvent. We abstract from
agency con‡icts between DIF, CB and supervisors.3
A crucial element in our discussion will be whether supervision is e¢cient (i.e. in-
solvent banks are detected and closed) or not, and whether e¢cient closure rules can be
implemented, whereby although insolvent banks are not detected by supervisors, they can
be given incentives to declare bankruptcy at t = 1. We will consider three cases:
² e¢cient supervision in Section 3: insolvent banks are detected and closed at t = 1.
² e¢cient closure rules in Section 4: insolvent banks are not detected but are given
incentives to declare bankruptcy at t = 1.
3For an analysis of this issue see Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2001).
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² regulatory forbearance in Section 6: insolvent banks are not closed and gamble for
resurrection by investing in ine¢cient projects in the hope of surviving.
At date t = 0 bankers raise the amount D+E (deposits plus equity); pay the deposit
insurance premium, P , and invest I by making loans; the budget constraint of a bank is
thus:
I + P = D +E: (1)
We assume that the supply of deposits is in…nitely elastic at the (zero) market rate.
Equity is …xed. There is a perfectly competitive, risk-neutral, interbank market ready
to lend any amount at fair rates from t = 1 to t = 2. There is no aggregate liquidity
shock. Since liquidity is available at fair rates at t = 1, it is optimal for banks to keep zero
reserves.4 Investment is subject to constant returns to scale. The gross rate of return at
t = 2 of the investment is ~R = R1 in case of success and ~R = R0 in case of failure, with
R1 > 1 > R0 > 0.
2.2 Liquidity and solvency shocks
The state k = S; L;N is privately observed by the banker. In state S (solvency shock),
which occurs with probability ¯S, the banker learns that his bank in insolvent, i.e. that the
probability of success of its investment at t = 2 is zero. In other words ~R = R0 for sure. If
state S does not occur, the probability of success
³
~R = R1
´
is p, but the bank can be hit
by a liquidity shock (state L), which occurs with unconditional probability (1¡ ¯S)¯L. In
state L, the bank is illiquid: it faces a deposit withdrawal that for computational simplicity
we assume it proportional to bank assets, ` ´ ¸I, with 0 < ¸ < 1: If the bank cannot
…nd su¢cient liquidity to serve these withdrawals, it is forced to liquidate prematurely.
For simplicity, the liquidation value of assets is equal to R0I (the same as when the bank
fails). Finally with complementary probability (1 ¡ ¯S) ¯N (with ¯N + ¯L = 1) the bank
is in state N (no shock)5.
Figure 1 summarizes the di¤erent possibilities in our model.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.3 Bankers’ incentives
The role of banks in our model is to channel funds to …nance ”safe and sound” projects.
We model two types of actions that bankers can take in this respect:
4When aggregate liquidity is scarce reserve holdings become important (see e.g. Bhatthacharya and
Gale 1987).
5An alternative modelling assumption could be that banks can be hit by a liquidity shock and a
solvency shock. Thus we would have a fourth possibility where an insolvent bank may be illiquid. If this
bank does not borrow ¸I it is forced to close. If it does borrow ¸I , to stay in business it would have to
use the loan to repay the impatient depositors and thus it could not use it to gamble for resurrection.
Since nothing would change in our analysis, for simplicity we maintain the assumption that there are
three states of the world, i.e. the insolvent bank has no liquidity needs.
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² screening projects at t = 0: i.e. choosing projects that have a reasonable probability
of being successful;
² monitoring projects at t = 1: i.e. ensuring that borrowers will ful…l their repayment
obligations as much as they can.
Supervisors’ actions (e.g. closing insolvent banks) as well as those of the Central Bank
(e.g. providing emergency liquidity assistance to illiquid banks) will a¤ect bankers’ pro…ts
and their incentives to screen and monitor their loans. Let Bjk ¸ 0 denote the pro…t rate6
(i.e. per unit of investment) of the banker at date t = 2, after state k = S; L;N and
conditionally on success (j = 1) or failure (j = 0) : Similarly, let BS denote the pro…t rate
of the banker in state S (in which case failure is certain). Notice that since the t = 2
return is observable7 and the bankers are risk neutral, it is optimal to set B0k = 0 when
k = L;N; that is when a solvent bank fails. This allows us to simplify the notation so
that B1k will be denoted simply Bk; k = L;N:
In this paper we abstract from the analysis of contagion that may arise when a bank
fails (see among others Freixas and Parigi 1998 for contagion via the payment system) and
that is often invoked to justify CB lending. Thus we assume that when an insolvent bank
is closed at t = 1 or a bank fails at t = 2
³
~R = R0
´
there are no systemic repercussions
on the banking system as a whole.
The screening decision of the banker is modelled as follows: exerting a screening e¤ort
at time t = 0 costs the banker e0 and limits the probability of a solvency shock to ¯S.
Absent the screening e¤ort, the probability of a solvency shock becomes ¯S + ¢¯, with
¢¯ > 0: The banker will exert the screening e¤ort (which we assume to be e¢cient) if and
only if his ex ante expected pro…t from screening exceeds that without screening, namely;
¯SBS+(1¡ ¯S)p(¯NBN+¯LBL)¡e0 ¸ (¯S +¢¯)BS+(1 ¡ ¯S ¡ ¢¯)p (¯NBN + ¯LBL)
(2)
which simpli…es to
p (¯NBN + ¯LBL) ¸ e0¢¯ + BS; (MH0) : (3)
We call this the moral hazard constraint at t = 0 (or screening constraint).
Similarly the monitoring decision of the banker is modelled as follows: exerting a
monitoring e¤ort at t = 1 costs the banker e1 and ensures a probability of success of p:
Absent the monitoring e¤ort, the probability of success is only p (1¡ ±) ; with 0 < ± < 1:
We assume that it is always e¢cient that the banker exerts this monitoring e¤ort. The
banker will exert the monitoring e¤ort after state k if and only if
pBk ¡ e1 ¸ p (1¡ ±)Bk; (4)
6The formulas for these pro…t rates will be developed later, as a function of the di¤erent institutional
arrangements that we consider.
7Aghion et al. (1999) as well as Mitchell (2001) have shown that if the reurns are unobservable there
may be an asymmetric information rent for the banks.
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which simpli…es in
Bk ¸ e1±p; k = L;N; (MH1) : (5)
We call this the moral hazard constraint at t = 1 (or monitoring constraint).
Notice that closure or continuation decisions made at t = 1 are fully anticipated and
will have a di¤erent impact on screening e¤ort (decided before t = 1). The di¤erence
between the expected pro…t in case of solvency, ¯NBN + ¯LBL, and the expected pro…t
in case of insolvency BS is a measure of market discipline. A large di¤erence between the
two, characteristic of market discipline, will provide banks with the right incentives to
screen.
The sequence of the events is summarized in the following diagram.
j——————–j—————————–j———————–j——————–j
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
contracts screening Liquidity/Solvency monitoring investment
o¤ered; e¤ort choice, shocks occur; e¤ort choice return R0; R1
equity, investment orderly closure
deposits made of insolvent banks
raised or GFR
2.4 Prudential regulation
In our model prudential regulation is justi…ed by the fact that depositors cannot control
the screening and monitoring activities of bankers. Regulation is there to ensure that
bankers have appropriate incentives to do their job (i.e. exert screening and monitoring
e¤ort) and that the DIF does not lose money in expected terms.
Regulation can be seen as a contract between the FSA (representing the interest of
the depositors) and the bankers. This contract speci…es I (how much a bank can lend)
and the pro…t rates of the bankers in di¤erent states of the world, as a function of E
(the equity of the banker) and the parameters characterizing investments and bankers’
actions. At this stage, we don’t discuss the implementation of the optimal contract. In
particular we do not specify how liquidity needs of banks are …nanced at t = 1.
The time t = 0 budget constraint, I = E+D¡P; states that bank’s assets are …nanced
with equity E; plus deposits D; with zero remuneration, but insured at the cost P: This
imposes a constraint on the depositors’ participation. This comes from the fact that the
total expected return on the project, I ¹R, where ¹R ´ ¯SR0 + (1 ¡ ¯S) (pR1 + (1¡ p)R0)
is the expected rate of return at t = 0 on the projects …nanced by the bank, has to be dis-
tributed among the two types of claim holders, insured depositors (entitled to a net payo¤
D ¡ P ) and equity holders, but there is a minimum expected pro…t rate that is needed
to provide bankers with appropriate incentive, ¹¼ ´ ¯SBS + p (¯LBL + ¯NBN) (1¡ ¯S) :
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For the project to be able to pay to all its claim holders, we need
I ¹R ¸ ¹¼I +D ¡ P
and replacing D ¡ P from equation (1) the resulting constraint for outside investors at
t = 0 is
I
¡ ¹R ¡ 1¢ ¸ ¹¼I ¡ E; (IP ) : (6)
This constraint states that the expected net return on bank’s assets, that is the social
surplus (left hand side of the inequality) is at least equal to the expected increase in
shareholder value (or equivalently that the bank has not been subsidized by outsiders).
We assume that at t = 0 projects have a positive expected NPV, i.e. ¹R > 1; and that the
bank need capital, i.e. ¹R < 1 + ¹¼: In turn ¹R > 1 implies that pR1 + (1 ¡ p)R0 > 1; that
is an illiquid bank has a positive expected NPV from continuation.
Notice that constraint (IP ) can be restated as a capital adequacy requirement,
E
I
¸ K; (7)
where K ´ ¹¼ +1 ¡ ¹R is the capital ratio and it is positive by assumption.
It is worth pointing out that this formulation introduces an endogenous opportunity
cost of capital. Any increase in the aggregate amount of equity ¢E; results in an increase
in the size of banks and therefore in an increase of the banking sector ¢I = ¢EK , which
generates an increase in the expected output ¢I
¡ ¹R¡ 1¢.
Finally, we assume that liquidity shocks are small with respect to the rate of return
on the investment, i.e. ¸ < R0: This re‡ects the idea that ”the probability that a modern
bank is solvent, but illiquid, and at the same time lacks su¢cient collateral to obtain
regular central bank funding is [...] quite small” (Padoa Schioppa 1999).8 For example, in
the U.S. discount window loans in a typical day amount to few hundred millions dollars.9
3 E¢cient supervision: detection and closure of in-
solvent banks
To begin with, we examine the case where the shocks at t = 1 are public information:
thus insolvent banks are detected and closed at t = 1. This benchmark case corresponds
to the ideal framework where supervisors have perfect information about banks’ shocks.
In practice regulators may not able to detect and or close insolvent banks, a point we
examine in the next section.
8 If the liquidity shock is large (¸ > R0) loans cannot be fully collateralized. Bailing out banks may
cause losses and thus may require additional resources. The additional resources may involve taxpayer
money from the Treasury if bank insolvency may cause systemic risk or from the Deposit Insurance fund
otherwise.
9However, they reached the level of $46 billion in the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bartolini
and Prati 2003).
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The closure of an insolvent bank could, nevertheless, be obtained, for some parameter
constellation, if the implementation of the e¢cient interbank lending structure leads banks
to self selection. If so, the …rst best is achieved in spite of the lack of information regarding
the solvency shocks, a point we examine in subsection 3.3.
We introduce here the structure of the problem of …nding the optimal contract. The
mathematical treatment will be the same in this section and in sections 4 and 6 where
we consider the two other regulatory frameworks. Our approach will be to look for the
optimal allocation and then introduce the institutional arrangements to implement it.
3.1 The optimal allocation when supervision is e¢cient
The optimal allocation can be obtained by solving a two-stage program by backward
induction. The second stage consists in maximizing the size of the investment, under the
investor participation constraint (or capital adequacy requirement), i.e.
maxI s.t. (IP ) : (8)
The …rst stage consists in …nding bankers’ expected pro…t rates in the various states that
minimize bankers’s ex ante expected pro…ts ¹¼ under the limited liability and the moral
hazard constraints, solving the following program (}1) ; namely:
minBL ;BN ;BS ¹¼ s.t. (9)
BS ¸ 0; (LL) (10)
p (¯NBN + ¯LBL) ¸ e0¢¯ + BS; (MH0) (11)
Bk ¸ e1p± ; k = L;N , (MH1) : (12)
The solution of (}1) is characterized in the following proposition.10
Proposition 1. When supervision is e¢cient, the optimal allocation speci…es a zero
pro…t rate for insolvent banks (state S) and the same pro…t rate in the two other states L
and N: BS = 0 ; BN = BL = max
³
e1
p± ;
e0
p¢¯
´
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2 Implementing the optimal allocation
Let us now adopt a positive viewpoint and determine what institutional arrangements
are needed in order to implement the e¢cient allocation characterized above. First notice
that BS = 0 is obtained simply by closing the insolvent banks and fully expropriating
bankers, as in a standard bankruptcy procedure. The second characteristic of the optimal
allocation is that bankers obtain the same pro…t rate in the two remaining states, i.e.
whether or not a bank experiences a liquidity shock (BN = BL) : Since illiquid banks
10Notice that the limited liability constraint can only bind is state S, since constraint (MH1) implies
that Bk > 0 for k = L;N:
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(state L) have to borrow ¸I (in order to repay unexpected withdrawals at date 1) their
pro…t rate in case of success at date 2 is
BL = R1 ¡ (D ¡ ¸I) + ½I (13)
where D ¡ ¸I represents the repayment to the depositors who have not withdrawn at
date 1 and ½ is the repayment on the loan contracted at date 1. Since we have normalized
the riskless interest rate to 0, the quantity ½ ¡ ¸I can be interpreted as the net cost of
borrowing for the bank:
½ ¡ ¸I = ¾¸I (14)
where ¾ is the spread charged by the lender to the borrowing bank. Since we assume a
competitive interbank market, this spread is zero if the interbank loan is collateralized
but positive if there is credit risk.
By contrast, N banks do not have to borrow at t = 1, so that their pro…t rate in case
of success at t = 2 is
BN = R1 ¡ DI : (15)
Using relations (13), (14), (15) we see that BN ¡BL = ¾¸:
Proposition 1 shows that e¢ciency requires that BN = BL , i.e. that there is no risk
spread in the interbank market. This implies that the repayment of interbank market
loans has to be fully guaranteed. In fact, the implementation needs not imply any direct
involvement of the DIF, since interbank loans could be either senior to deposits or fully
collateralized on the bank’s assets which is possible since ¸ < R0. Thus when supervision
is e¢cient so that a banks is closed as soon as it becomes insolvent, there is no reason to
penalize with a positive spread a bank that becomes illiquid.
In reality, however, interbank loans are typically unsecured, for example in the market
for reserves where depository institutions lend reserves to each other at overnight maturity.
Why would an unsecured interbank market possibly lead to an ine¢cient allocation? The
answer is that when loans in the interbank market are risky, we have BL = BN ¡ ¾¸.
However, because of the monitoring moral hazard constraint, BL cannot be smaller than
e1
p± . This means that BN has to be increased above this level, implying a reduction in the
banks’ lending capacity, an increase in the capital requirement, and a reduction in social
surplus.11
The other tools for implementing the e¢cient allocation are the capital ratio and the
DIF premium. Banks maximization of I yields the optimal level of investment ¹I: The
capital ratio
K :K · E¹I (16)
is chosen to coincide with the optimum so that
E =
£
¹¼ ¡ ¹R+ 1¤ ¹I = ¹K ¹I (17)
11Strictly speaking, when e1± <
e0
¢¯ , program }
1 has multiple solutions, some of them being compatible
with a (small) spread. For simplicity we focus on the solution described in Proposition 1.
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where ¹K denotes the capital ratio that solves (16) with equality. Since the Deposit
Insurance premium is actuarially fair, we have that:
P =
24¯S + (1 ¡ ¯S) (1 ¡ p)| {z }
prob. of failure
35 24D ¡ (R0 + ¸) ¹I| {z }
net DIF liabilities
35 : (18)
The bank’s budget constraint at t = 0 (equation 1) together with (18) determines the
values of P and D.
3.3 Implementing the e¢cient allocation under adverse selec-
tion
Theoretically, it would be possible to implement the e¢cient allocation even in the pres-
ence of adverse selection. We brie‡y examine this case, for the sake of completeness.
The main bene…t of showing what happens in this case is that it allows us to establish
forcefully that any reasonable framework for the analysis of the interbank market and the
LOLR has to take into account the existence of the bankers’ incentives to avoid closure
and remain in business.
Notice that when bank’s type of shocks are not observable (adverse selection), it is
still possible to implement the e¢cient allocation, as long as an insolvent bank cannot
take actions that are detrimental to social welfare. This comes from the fact that returns
on bank’s assets are observable. Thus, whenever a bank fails (eR = R0); the DIF is entitled
to seize all its assets, implying B0N = B0L = 0, as we have assumed, and BS = 0; a secured
interbank market which implies ¾ = 0; will then allow to obtain the e¢cient allocation
with BN = BL. In particular no CB intervention for ELA is needed to implement the
e¢cient allocation.
The situation changes if we introduce an additional feature (which we believe to be
realistic) namely that the managers of an insolvent bank have an incentive to remain in
business, either because of the possibility to divert assets from the bank or because they
are able to gamble for resurrection. This is what we investigate in the next section.
4 E¢cient closure
Rapid developments in technology and …nancial sophistication can impair the ability of
regulators to maintain a safe and sound banking system (See e.g. Fur…ne 2001). To cap-
ture this, we suppose from now on that insolvent banks cannot be detected by regulators,
and can attempt to gamble for resurrection (GFR). By this we mean that insolvent banks
can borrow the same amount of liquidity ¸I of illiquid banks and invest it without being
detected. By assuming that insolvent and illiquid banks have the same liquidity needs
we make it easier for an insolvent bank to mimic an illiquid, and a as result, we give
the regulators the harder case to handle. Borrowing any amount di¤erent from ¸I would
immediately reveal that a bank is not illiquid.
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We assume that this additional investment gives an insolvent bank a second chance,
i.e. a positive (but small) probability of success pg ´ ®p (with 0 < ® < 1) for the bank’s
projects. We assume pg (R1 ¡R0) < ¸; that is this reinvestment has a negative expected
NPV. In spite of this, managers of an insolvent bank may decide to use this reinvest-
ment possibility in the hope that the bank recovers. We call this behavior ”gambling
for resurrection” by reference to the behavior of ”zombie” Savings and Loans during the
U.S. S&L crisis in the 1980s. The negative expected NPV from continuation implies that
managers would actually be better o¤ by ”stealing ” the money altogether at t = 1, if
they could get away with it. Indeed the negative expected NPV assumption is equivalent
to pgR1+ (1¡ pg)R0 < ¸+R0 so that ”stealing” dominates ”gambling for resurrection”.
Akerlof and Romer (1993) document such looting behavior during the U.S. S&L crisis.
Here we focus on GFR by assuming a large ”cost of stealing”, namely that ”looters” get
ultimately only a small fraction of what they steal, so that GFR is a more pro…table
behavior for bankers.
Providing bankers with the incentives not to gamble for resurrection implies that the
bankers who declare bankruptcy at t = 1 are allowed to keep a positive pro…t. We interpret
this as a bail-out of the insolvent bank. The rate of pro…t BS of the banker, following
a bail-out, has to be larger or equal to the expected pro…t obtained from engaging in
gambling for resurrection. Gambling for resurrection implies obtaining the same rate of
pro…t in case of success as an L bank, BL: However, an insolvent bank that gambles for
resurrection has to make an additional investment ¸I: Thus the pro…t rate from GFR in
case of success is BL ¡ ¸, and the expected pro…t rate is pg (BL ¡ ¸). Thus GFR will be
prevented if an insolvent bank obtains an expected pro…t rate at least equal to this value.
This introduces a new constraint:
BS ¸ pg (BL ¡ ¸) ; (GFR) : (19)
As we show in the sequel the possibility for an insolvent bank to GFR creates an externality
between the interbank market and the DIF.12
4.1 Optimal allocation with orderly closure
The most e¢cient way to avoid gambling for resurrection is for the FSA to provide
the monetary incentives to the managers of insolvent banks for spontaneously declaring
bankruptcy (See Aghion et al. 1999 and Mitchell 2001). This means in practice that
the FSA can organize an orderly closure procedure that allows to avoid gambling for
resurrection (or asset substitution). In this procedure the bank managers are able to
secure a pro…t rate BS in spite of the failure of their bank. In contrast with the previous
case of e¢cient supervision (where insolvent banks are detected and closed), the fact that
bankers receive a strictly positive pro…t even in the event of insolvency implies that their
ex ante expected rate of pro…t is higher. But this implies, in turn, that a bank will face ex
12We have chosen to model GFR as the main preoccupation of bank supervisors. We could have
assumed instead that bank managers are able to engage in ine¢cient assets substitution in order to
expropriate value from the DIF. Our results would essentially carry over to this slightly di¤erent modelling
assumption.
12
ante a higher capital requirement and will invest less: this is the social cost of ine¢cient
supervision.
The program that describes the optimal contract is again the one that maximizes the
size of the investment under the capital adequacy requirement:
max I s.t. (20)
I
¡ ¹R¡ 1¢ ¸ ~¼I ¡ E (21)
where the ex ante expected pro…t rate of the bankers ~¼ ´ ¯SBS+p (¯LBL + ¯NBN) (1 ¡¯S)
is found solving the following program (}2)
min
BL ;BN ;BS
~¼ s.t. (22)
(LL) ; (MH0) ; (MH1) ; (GFR):
If ¸ > e1±p ; then the GFR constraint does not bind, and the program (}
2) has the same
solutions as (}1) : Therefore we assume henceforth ¸ < e1±p: We establish the following
result.
Proposition 2. If ¸ < e1±p then (}
2) has a unique solution. This solution is such that
bankers who declare insolvency receive the minimum expected pro…t that prevents them
from gambling for resurrection: BS = pg
³
e1
±p ¡ ¸
´
> 0. The pro…t rates in the other
states (L and N) depend on which moral hazard constraint binds.
If it is the monitoring constraint (Case a), which occurs if e1± ¸ e0¢¯ + BS; then
BN = BL = e1p± : Bankers obtain the same pro…t rate whether or not they experience a
liquidity shock.
On the contrary if the screening constraint dominates (Case b), i.e. when e1± <
e0
¢¯ +
BS; then the pro…t rate is higher for banks who do not experience a liquidity shock: BN =
1
p¯N
³
e0
¢¯ + BS
´
¡ ¯L¯N e1p± ; BL = e1p± < BN :
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Implementing the optimal allocation with orderly closure
Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal allocation in the case where supervision is ine¢-
cient (i.e. the insolvent banks are not detected at t = 1) but the FSA (or the DIF) has the
power to provide direct monetary incentives to the owner-managers of an insolvent bank
who spontaneously declares bankruptcy at t = 1. In such a way, gambling for resurrection
is avoided.
It is important to stress that this way of handling bank closure contrasts with the
conventional wisdom, that states that a generous bail-out policy hampers market dis-
cipline and generates moral hazard. Our results shows that this conventional wisdom
may be an oversimpli…ed view of the world, and points out at the trade-o¤ between the
bene…ts of market discipline and the costs of gambling for resurrection when insolvency
is not detected. By modelling explicitly screening and moral hazard constraints and the
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possibility to gamble for resurrection, we account for a rich array of possible bankers’ be-
haviors that generate complex interactions. It is true that guaranteeing a positive pro…t
BS to the bankers who spontaneously declare bankruptcy at t = 1 makes it more di¢cult
for the FSA to prevent moral hazard at date 0 and imposes an additional cost to the
DIF. However, by knowing that the expected pro…t rate of an insolvent bank is less than
that of a solvent bank (BS < ¯LBL + ¯NBN), bankers have the right incentives to exert
e¤ort at t = 0 to avoid being insolvent. To summarize, thus, BS has to be su¢ciently
high to induce self selection of an insolvent bank, and ¯LBL+ ¯NBN has to be increased
accordingly in order to keep the bankers’ incentives to screen intact. For these reasons,
the ex ante capital requirement has to be increased. This has a cost in our model, since
it implies that K increases in the capital requirement constraint KI · E; and therefore
that, for a given level of equity, the size of the banking sector is reduced. As we will show
in section 6, this cost is unavoidable, even if insolvency is a highly unlikely event, in the
sense that if we allow a bank to gamble for resurrection it will secure the level of pro…ts
BS at a higher cost to society, since ¯LBL+ ¯NBN cannot be decreased and therefore the
size of the banking sector cannot be increased.
Still this is the most e¢cient way to prevent gambling for resurrection (or more gen-
erally asset substitution). Once insolvency has occurred, it would be ine¢cient (both ex
post and ex ante) to impose penalties on the bank who spontaneously declares insolvency,
since this would encourage gambling for resurrection, a behavior costly to society. From
a policy view point, this justi…es a crisis resolution mechanism involving some kind of
bail out of a failing bank. Such a mechanism has been advocated recently by Aghion et
al. (1999), Mitchell (2001) and Gorton and Huang (2002). However, there is an obvious
criticism to such a mechanism, namely that it can lead to regulatory forbearance and
possibly to corruption. If the FSA (or the DIF) has all discretion to distribute money to
the owners-managers of banks, organized frauds can be envisaged, at least if the banks
supervisors are not above all suspicion. This is why we examine in Section 6 an alternative
set of assumptions where such monetary transfers are ruled out.
Regarding the di¤erence between Case (a) and Case (b), in Case (a), (BN = BL; BS >
0) the monitoring constraint is binding and the implementation is the same as before.
Provided that interbank market loans are either senior or fully collateralized, the e¢-
cient allocation will be implemented by the interbank market without any need of CB
intervention.
In Case (b), though, BN > BL implies that loans must be made with an interest rate
spread ¾¤ which can be computed from the above values:
BN ¡BL = ¾¤¸ = 1p¯N
µ
e0
¢¯
+ e1
±p
(pg ¡ p) ¡ pg¸
¶
: (23)
However, the actual interbank market spread when loans are not fully collateralized is de-
termined by the condition of zero expected return, implying in the case that the insolvent
bank is bailed out (¯S = 0)
¾(0) =
1¡ p
p
: (24)
Thus, it is only if ¾(0) = ¾¤ that the e¢cient allocation will be reached by the interbank
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market. In general, the e¢cient allocation will not be reached, and we will have to consider
two possible cases, depending on whether ¾(0) < ¾¤ or the opposite inequality holds.
In the …rst case, ¾(0) < ¾¤; it is optimal that an illiquid bank borrows at a penalty
rate, but this is incompatible with the normal functioning of the interbank market. Notice
that the rationale for ”lending at a penalty rate” is here completely di¤erent from the one
in Bagehot. In our framework the issue of e¢cient reserves management does not arise.
Lending with a penalty is desirable only as a mean to reduce the pro…ts from GFR and
therefore the cost of bailing-out banks.
In summary, when the monitoring constraint is binding (Case a), interbank market
loans have to be fully secured in order to implement the e¢cient allocation. Instead,
when the screening constraint is binding (Case b) the e¢cient solution in general is not
implementable, unless restrictions are put on the functioning of interbank markets. This
means that the presence of interbank markets puts a limit to the power of the incentive
scheme that the FSA can use to encourage bankers to exert screening e¤orts.
5 Central Bank Lending
Once we recognize the impossibility for the Central Bank to provide ELA at a higher rate
than the interbank market, the potential role of the CB is limited to situations where
¾(0) > ¾¤: In this case though, the CB has an advantage over the interbank market in
that it can override the priority of the DIF claims and thus lend under better terms than
the market. Gorton and Huang (2002) argue precisely that governments cannot improve
upon a coalition of banks in providing liquidity unless they have more power than private
agents, e.g. they can seize assets. In practice, Lender of Last Resort operations are almost
always the responsibility of the Central Bank while the Deposit Insurance Fund is usually
managed by a public agency or the banking industry itself (See Kahn and Santos 2001 and
Repullo 2000). We study in the next section how and when this ELA can be provided.
5.1 The operational framework
Goodfriend and Lacker (1999 p.12 and 14) provide detailed evidence for the fact that,
in the U.S., lending by the FED is in general collateralized and favored in bank failure
resolution with the FDIC assuming ”the borrowing’s bank indebtedness to the FED in
exchange for the collateral, relieving the FED of the risk of falling collateral value” (p.14).
Of course the risk is shifted on the DIF.
Similarly, all credit operations by the Eurosystem must be collateralized13 with the
Eurosystem accepting a broader class of collateral than the FED. Under the ELA arrange-
ments, LOLR in the Eurosystem is conducted mainly at the NCBs level at the initiative
of the NCBs and not of the ECB. NCBs can make collateralized loans up to a threshold
without prior authorization from the ECB. Larger operations that may have a potential
impact on monetary policy must be approved by the ECB. Since the costs and risks of
13Art 18.1 of the ECB/ESCB Statute (Issing et al. 2001).
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ELA operations conducted autonomously by the NCBs are to be borne at the national
level, NCBs would have some leeway in relation to collateral policy, as long as some
national authority takes the risk (e.g. inform of a guarantee).14
5.2 The terms of Central Bank Lending
The terms at which the CB has to o¤er ELA, in order to implement the e¢cient allocation
are directly deduced from Proposition 2. Formally:
Proposition 3. If the screening constraint is binding, and if the optimal spread ¾¤
is lower than the interbank spread ¾(0), then the CB can improve upon the unsecured
interbank market solution by lending at a rate ¾¤ against good collateral .
Several observations are in order. First, the possibility of ELA by the CB allows
to reach the e¢cient allocation by increasing the L bank pro…t rate up to its e¢ciency
level. This is possible by using the discount window facility and lending to illiquid banks
at better terms than the market, so that they are not penalized by the high interbank
market spreads.
Second, there is a trade o¤ between lending to illiquid banks at better terms, and
discouraging insolvent banks from GFR. This trade o¤ and the interaction between reg-
ulation and liquidity provision are captured by the constraint BS ¸ pg (BL ¡ ¸) which
shows that BL has to be lowered if one wants to decrease the pro…t BS left to insolvent
banks. This is the condition that allows to sort illiquid from insolvent banks. Indeed,
an insolvent bank is less pro…table than an illiquid bank for two reasons: it needs an
additional investment ¸I and it succeeds with a lower probability, pg = ®p < p: Thus the
insolvent bank cannot a¤ord to borrow at the same interest rate than the illiquid bank.
By charging a suitably high interest rate, the CB discourages an insolvent bank from bor-
rowing.15 Moreover by requiring good collateral and therefore e¤ectively overriding the
priority of the DIF claims, the CB can lend at better terms than the interbank market.
Third, it is important to stress that the type of ELA envisioned here - collateralized
CB lending in the amount ¸I - does not result in the use of tax payer money, but in a
higher DIF premium that lowers bank’s size. Observing that a failing bank’s assets are
no longer R0I but (R0 ¡ ¸) I; because the CB has priority over ¸I; and that I is smaller
than in the case where the insolvent bank is detected, the new DIF premium becomes
P = [¯s+ (1¡ ¯s) (1 ¡ p)] [D ¡ (R0 ¡ ¸+ ¸) I] (25)
14The operational procedures through which the two Central Banks lend money to banks for regular
liquidity management have become more similar recently (Bartolini and Prati 2003), with the FED
converging toward a system of Lombard-type facility. First with the Special Lending Facility around
Y2K and then at the beginning of 2003 the FED has begun to make collateralized loans to banks on a
no-question-asked-basis and at penalty rates over the target federal funds rate (Bartolini and Prati 2003)
as opposed to rates 0.25 point to 0.50 point below the fund rate over the last 10 years. Similarly in
the Eurosystem one of the main pillars of liquidity management is the Marginal Lending Facility which
banks can access at their own discretion to borrow reserves at overnight maturity from the Eurosystem
at penalty rates (Issing et al. 2001).
15Notice that the N bank has no incentive to borrow ¸I from the CB and lend it again to the market
at a higher rate, because no bank would be ready to borrow at such a rate, which is higher than what
they pay when they borrow from the CB.
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which is larger than the one in (18) where GFR is not an option.
Fourth, remark that a fully secured interbank market will be here ine¢cient. In Case
(b) the solution requires a spread between BN and BL; BN = BL + ¸¾; when ¾(0) <
¾¤; banks would generate a lower surplus with collateralized loans than with the optimal
spread ¾¤: If instead ¾(0) > ¾¤; then a fully secured interbank market would prevent the
Central Bank from lending and reaching the e¢cient solution.
Finally, notice that by making explicit ex ante the rules of ELA from the Central Bank
and thus by making explicit the pro…ts that insolvent banks can receive if they accepts an
orderly closure, is an e¤ective way to deal with the issue of moral hazard and gambling
for resurrection. This is to be contrasted with the notion that constructive ”ambiguity”
with respect to the conduct of the CB in crisis situations would reduce the scope for moral
hazard.
5.3 When is CB intervention useful?
Proposition 3 gives two conditions that characterize the cases in which there is a role for
ELA by the CB. These conditions require that the screening constraint be binding:
1¡ ®
±
e1 · e0¢¯ ¡ ®p¸ (26)
and that the interbank market spread be larger than the optimal spread, which, using
(23) and (24), gives
e0
¢¯
¡ e1
µ
1¡ ®
±
¶
+ p¸ (¯N ¡ ®) < ¸¯N . (27)
After simple manipulations, we can see that these two constraints amount to
p <
e0
¢¯ ¡ e1
¡
1¡®
±
¢
®¸ < p + (1 ¡ p)
¯N
® : (28)
This means that ELA by the CB is justi…ed in our model only under very speci…c condi-
tions: …rst e0¢¯¡e1
¡1¡®
±
¢
has to be positive, which means that the screening constraint (ex
ante moral hazard) has to dominate the monitoring constraint; second ¯N has to be large,
or rather the probability of a liquidity shock (1¡¯N) has to be small,16 which means that
the use of the discount window has to be limited to exceptional circumstances; …nally p
has to be small, or rather the probability of bank failure (1 ¡ p) has to be high enough,
which means that ELA is more likely to be needed during a recession or a banking crisis.
¯S is here irrelevant as the insolvent bank spontaneously declares bankruptcy.
Therefore the main conclusion of this Section is that CB intervention is not needed
when p is high (expansionary phase of the cycle). On the contrary the CB is necessary
to provide ELA during crisis periods (p low) essentially because market spreads are too
high.
16We also assume that ® is small so that ¯N > ®, in which case the third term in the above formula
decreases with p: This ensures that both conditions are satis…ed when p is small enough.
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6 Optimal allocation in the presence of GFR
O¤ering a subsidy to bail out banks that are experiencing …nancial distress may pose
di¢culties for regulators. It may well be di¢cult to prove that the money is well spent as
it prevented banks from GFR, which is not observed if the policy is successful. Regulatory
forbearance may therefore result. This may happen for example if the supervisors do not
have the discretion to distribute money to bankers and/or if this is not feasible for political
reasons. For these reasons in this section, we investigate the case where GFR cannot be
avoided because the FSA is not allowed to bail-out insolvent banks.
Thus at t = 1 insolvent banks (which are not detected because supervisors are inef-
…cient) do not have incentives to declare bankruptcy and thus they are not closed: they
borrow ¸I at the same terms than illiquid banks and invest it with probability of success
pg < p. The interbank market is then plagued by adverse selection, which leads to a high
spread: The probability of repayment of an interbank loan is smaller than in the case in
which gambling for resurrection can be prevented, namely
pGFR ´ ¯Spg + (1¡ ¯S)¯Lp¯s + (1 ¡ ¯S) ¯L < p (29)
where the RHS (LHS) of (29) is the probability of repayment of an interbank loan when
GFR can (cannot) be prevented. Thus the repayment required at the equilibrium of the
interbank market is
½ =
¸I
pGFR
; (30)
and the interbank market solution has a spread equal to
½
¸I
¡ 1 = 1
pGFR
¡ 1 = ¾ (¯S) (31)
which is increasing in ¯S:17
However, the e¢cient allocation is such that the pro…t rates of bankers in the di¤er-
ent states is unchanged. For example, for an insolvent bank it is still equal to BS =
pg (BL ¡ ¸) ; but the interpretation is di¤erent since this expected pro…t is now ob-
tained by GFR. The optimal incentive scheme for bankers is the same as in Proposi-
tion 2 and in particular, the ex ante expected pro…t rate of bankers is ~¼ ´ ¯SBS +
p (¯LBL + ¯NBN) (1¡ ¯S) : But the fact that an insolvent bank gambles for resurrection
lowers the overall expected return from ¹R to
R^ = ¯S [pgR1 + (1¡ pg)R0 ¡ ¸] + (1 ¡ ¯S) (pR1 + (1 ¡ p)R0) : (32)
The program that describes the e¢cient solution is again the one that maximizes the
size of the investment subject to the investors’ participation constraint:
max I s.t. (33)
I
³
R^¡ 1
´
¸ ~¼I ¡ E (34)
17Notice that when p = pg; the market spread becomes independent of ¯S ; ¾(¯S ) = ¾(0):
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where ~¼ is found solving program (}2) :We immediately deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When GFR cannot be prevented, in the optimal allocation the pro…t
rates obtained by bankers are the same as in Proposition 2. However, the overall net
return on bank’s assets is lower and the market spread on interbank loans is higher.
Several comments are in order. Like in the previous case, where GFR could be pre-
vented by e¢cient closure rules, the e¢cient allocation requires that interbank loans are
not collateralized. Therefore we suppose from now on that interbank loans are junior
(deposits are senior).
The overall deposit insurance premium when GFR occurs is
P = [¯S (1¡ pg) + (1¡ ¯S) (1¡ p)] [D ¡ (R0 + ¸)I ] : (35)
We now compare the capital ratio and the investment level under orderly closure,
K¤; I¤ and in the interbank market solution, K^; I^ with GFR. From the capital adequacy
requirement constraints,
E = I ¤
¡
~¼ ¡ ¹R+ 1¢ = I¤K¤ (36)
E = I^
³
~¼ ¡ R^+ 1
´
= I^K^ ; (37)
since R^ < ¹R and the ex ante expected pro…t for bankers, ~¼; are the same in the two
supervisory regimes, it follows that I^ < I¤ and K^ > K¤: Therefore the social cost of
ine¢cient closure rules is a lower level of investment.
Comparing these results with those of Section 5 (orderly closure) we notice that the
market spread there was ¾ (0) = ¸
³
1
p ¡ 1
´
which is smaller than the interbank spread
when gambling for resurrection cannot be prevented (¾ (¯S) from equation 31) because
of (29). Thus it is more likely that the CB can improve matters when GFR occurs. This
implies that the less e¢cient supervision, the more likely that CB has a role to play in
ELA. Or to put it di¤erently, forbearance by banking supervisors makes the ELA by the
CB more likely to be needed.
As a consequence, the conclusions of Proposition 3 carry over to an environment where
gambling for resurrection cannot be prevented provided that we replace ¾(0) by ¾(¯S):
The interpretation though will be slightly di¤erent since now CB lending through the
discount window will be justi…ed not only for high ¯N and low p; but also for high ¯S:
This comes from the fact that, absent bail-outs, the interbank market spread increases
with the probability that a bank is insolvent. Collateralized CB loans would shift the
losses on the DIF that would charge a higher premium than the one in (35) by the same
argument of equation (25) :
Once again, the less e¢cient bank supervision (the bigger ¯S) the more important is
the role of the CB.
Notice that when incentives for orderly closure are not provided, separation of insolvent
and illiquid banks does not take place, investment in the wasteful continuation of projects
cannot be prevented, and in providing ELA the CB may end up lending to an insolvent
bank as well.
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7 Policy Implications and Conclusions
Our analysis allows us to make a number of policy recommendations. First, our study
has implications for the optimal design of the interbank market. When market discipline
is the most important feature of an e¢cient banking system, because it gives the bankers
the incentives to screen their borrowers, the interbank market has to be unsecured and
the LOLR may intervene in order to limit illiquid bank’s excessive liquidation of assets.
On the other hand, if market discipline is not required in the interbank market (as it is
provided through another class of liabilities), a secured interbank market can reach the
e¢cient allocation, either through a repo market or bymaking senior the interbank market
claims. Notice, though, that the extreme market discipline position that advocates the no
intervention policy of the LOLR is incompatible with our results, since potentially there
is always the possibility that market discipline in the interbank market becomes crucial
and the LOLR has to intervene.
Second, there are fundamental externalities between the CB, interbank markets and
the banking supervisor. When supervision is not perfect, so that the insolvent bank cannot
be detected, interbank spreads are high, and there should be a Central Bank acting as a
LOLR. By contrast if supervision is e¢cient, interbank markets function well and the CB
has only (if any) a limited role to play as a Lender of Last Resort.
Third, although we have abstracted from agency con‡icts between the CB, the banking
supervisor and the DIF, our model o¤ers some indications about the optimal design of
their functions. If the CB is not in charge of supervision (like in our model) there is no
fear of regulatory capture. Furthermore the ability of the CB to shift losses from ELA on
the DIF strengthens the incentives of the supervisor to detect and close insolvent banks.
Our policy recommendation is therefore to have an independent CB providing ELA under
speci…c circumstances and a separate supervisor acting on behalf of DIF who bears the
losses in case of bank failure.
A fourth implication, connected with the previous point, is that the issue of the LOLR
intervention leads to a wider set of issues. The consistent design of an e¢cient market
for liquidity has to be based on the interaction between the following …ve regulatory
instruments: interbank lending (secured or unsecured), closure policy, capital requirement,
DIF premium, ELA lending terms. These instruments, although controlled by potentially
di¤erent and independent institutions, should be designed in an integrated fashion.
Finally, the conditions for the access to ELA should be made known in advance to all
interested parties, as already advocated in the ”classical” view. This recommendation
contrasts with the notion of ”constructive ambiguity ” often invoked to reduce the moral
hazard allegedly associated with a CB safety net. On the contrary by making explicit
ex ante that ELA will be structured to penalize insolvent banks (BS < ¯LBL+ ¯NBN),
provides bankers with the strongest incentives to reduce the probability of insolvency.
To summarize, the traditional doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort has been criticized
on at least three important grounds. First, with modern interbank markets, it is not clear
that the CB has a speci…c role to play anymore in providing emergency liquidity assistance
to individual banks in distress. Second, it is not possible to distinguish clearly insolvent
banks from illiquid banks. Third, the presence of a Lender of Last Resort may generate
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moral hazard by banks.
In this paper these three criticisms are taken into account. In particular we consider
two di¤erent forms of moral hazard by banks: on the screening of borrowers (before
loans are granted), on the monitoring (after loans are granted, but before they have been
repaid), and we allow for gambling for resurrection by insolvent banks.
We explicitly introduce into our model e¢cient interbank markets that can also provide
emergency liquidity assistance to the banks that have su¢cient collateral or are ready to
pay competitive credit market rates. Our …rst main …nding is that there is a potential
role for ELA by the CB but only during crisis periods, when market spreads are too high.
In the other periods liquidity provision by the interbank market is su¢cient. Second, the
main superiority of the CB over the interbank lenders is that it can change the priority
of claims, and therefore lend at lower rates than the market.
In the end, unlike its ”classical” predecessor, the LOLR of the 21st Century lies at the
intersection of monetary policy, supervision and regulation of the banking industry, and
design of the interbank market. The issue is not ”what are the rules the LOLR should
follow?” but rather ”what architecture for the liquidity markets?”.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It is obviously optimal to set BS = 0: Then program (}1)
reduces to:
min
BN ;BL
p (¯NBN + ¯LBL) (38)
p (¯NBN + ¯LBL) ¸ e0¢¯ (39)
Bk ¸ e1p± ; k = L;N . (40)
The set of solutions depends on whether e0¢¯ <
e1
± or not. In the …rst case there is
a unique solution: BL = BN = e1p± : In the second case any feasible couple BL; BN such
that the …rst constraint is binding is a solution. For simplicity we focus on the particular
solution BL = BN = e0p¢¯ :
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote with °i; i = 1; 2; 3; 4; the Lagrange multipliers of
the constraints of the program (}2) : The Lagrangean becomes
¤ = ~¼ ¡ °1
³
pBN ¡ e1±
´
¡ °2
³
pBL ¡ e1±
´
¡ °3 (BS ¡ pg¸ [BL ¡ ¸])¡
°4
µ
¯NpBN + ¯LpBL¡
µ
e0
¢¯
+BS
¶¶
: (41)
Thus
@¤
@BN
= (1¡ ¯S )¯N ¡ °1 ¡ °4¯N = 0 (42)
@¤
@BL
= (1¡ ¯S )¯L ¡ °2 ¡ °4¯L+ °3¸pgp = 0 (43)
@¤
@BS
= ¯S ¡ °3 + °4 = 0: (44)
Using the last equation, we obtain °3 ¸ ¯S > 0: From the …rst equation we have °1 =
(1¡ ¯S ¡ °4) ¯N ¸ 0; implying °4 · 1: The second equation °2 = (1 ¡ ¯S ¡ °4) ¯L +
°3¸
pg
p ¸ 0; entails °2 > 0 since °3 > 0: Thus the corresponding inequalities are always
binding: BL = e1p± ; BS = pg
h
e1
±p ¡ ¸
i
:
Therefore
BN = max
µ
e1
p±
;
1
p¯N
µ
e0
¢¯
+BS
¶
¡ ¯L
¯N
BL
¶
: (45)
In other words there are two cases:
a) °4 = 0; °1 > 0: BN =
e1
p± = BL; BS > 0 since ¸ <
e1
±p and ½ = `:
b) °1 = 0; °4 = 1: p (¯NBN + ¯LBL) =
³
e0
¢¯ + BS
´
: This allows to determine BN (> BL) ; ½ >
`:
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After replacing BL; condition e1p± >
1
p¯N
³
e0
¢¯ +BS
´
¡ ¯L¯N e1±p is equivalent to e1± >
e0
¢¯ + BS ; where BS = pg
h
e1
±p ¡ ¸
i
thus proving Proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Events, Actions, Returns
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